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Abstract
We design a mechanism for Fair and Efficient Distribution of Resources (FEDoR) in
the presence of strategic agents. We consider a multiple-instances, Bayesian setting,
where in each round the preference of an agent over the set of resources is a private
information. We assume that in each of r rounds n agents are competing for k non-
identical indivisible goods, (n > k). In each round the strategic agents declare how
much they value receiving any of the goods in the specific round. The agent declaring
the highest valuation receives the good with the highest value, the agent with the second
highest valuation receives the second highest valued good, etc. Hence we assume a
decision function that assigns goods to agents based on their valuations. The novelty
of the mechanism is that no payment scheme is required to achieve truthfulness in a
setting with rational/strategic agents. The FEDoR mechanism takes advantage of the
repeated nature of the framework, and through a statistical test is able to punish the
misreporting agents and be fair, truthful, and socially efficient. FEDoR is fair in the
sense that, in expectation over the course of the rounds, all agents will receive the same
good the same amount of times. FEDoR is an eligible candidate for applications that
require fair distribution of resources over time. For example, equal share of bandwidth
for nodes through the same point of access. But further on, FEDoR can be applied in
less trivial settings like sponsored search, where payment is necessary and can be given
in the form of a flat participation fee. FEDoR can be a good candidate in a setting like
that to solve the problem of starvation of publicity slots for some advertisers that have a
difficult time determining their true valuations. To this extent we perform a comparison
with traditional mechanisms applied to sponsored search, presenting the advantage of
FEDoR.
Introduction
Resource allocation in an efficient and fair manner among strategic agents 1,that can
misreport their values to increase their benefit, is a non-trivial problem. The most
1We use the terms agent and player interchangeably
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straightforward approach is the design of mechanisms where, once the solution con-
cept is achieved, fairness and efficiency are guaranteed. In order for the designed
mechanism to be incentive compatible, economic incentives/payments must usually be
designed. In this work, we do not use any economic incentives/payments and hence our
mechanism design goals are achieved without any incentive constraint, that is without
money. There is a plethora a real world applications deriving from computer science
or from social sciences were payments can not be used as incentives for an allocation
mechanism.
In the field of computer science, FEDoR can be applied to solve the problem of
efficiently allocating CPU cycles between processes. Another application could be
the periodical allocation in a fair manner of bandwidth among nodes connected to the
same point of access. Imagine the scenario where many nodes are connected to the
same point of access. An application could be built to support the feature of nodes
declaring how much they value receiving bandwidth from the point of access at a spe-
cific time interval. Then, nodes would be served from the point of access according to
FEDoR. This would guarantee fairness and efficiency over time for all the nodes. More
applications can be imagined, where FEDoR could allocate resources over the cloud.
In this case it depends on the policy and the specific implementation on how FEDoR
could apply. For example, a number of users with only periodic demands for large
amount of resources could be sharing resources using FEDoR instead of resolving into
costly provisioning of resources.
Another possible application is hospitals sharing valuable equipment. No allocation
based on the money that each hospital is willing to give for renting the equipment can be
made. Hence, FEDoR is a perfect candidate, without monetary payments can guarantee
that all the hospitals sharing the valuable equipment will be allocated the same machine
the same amount of time in expectation and most importantly in an efficient manner
(when they most need it). Similar application could also be good candidates for FEDoR,
as long of course no life threatening decisions are left to be taken by the mechanism.
Based on the nature of the problem, we assume a Bayesian setting where agents
have private information. Agents can be cheating, declaring preferences that do not
correspond to their true valuations in an effort to increase their utility. Unlike mecha-
nisms with payments, were money incentives enforce the good behavior of the agents,
this is not the case here. FEDoR is designed especially to detect cheating and punish it.
This is feasible since FEDoR is designed to work in a repeated setting, which allows
the mechanism to gain knowledge on the agents’ valuations and appropriately punish
misbehaving agents, incentivizing their good behavior. Using the concept of linking
mechanisms (explained in the Previous and Related Work paragraph) the mechanism
is able to guarantee fairness and social efficiency.
We are assuming that preferences are declared within a common unit measure. In
realistic applications, valuations might not even appear within the same unit of mea-
sure. Agents might not be able to associate their valuation under a common unit of
measure. To deal with this matter FEDoR uses a common normalization process called
Probability Integral Transformation (PIT) [21]. Using PIT any cumulative probability
distribution function can be transformed to the uniform [0,1] distribution. Essentially,
the PIT of a value x extracted from a probability distribution is the aggregated proba-
bility of the values no larger than x in the distribution. Intuitively, it is similar to the
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percentile of x. Under the assumption that FEDoR has a historical sample of the agents’
valuations, a distribution fitting the agents valuations can be defined. Since knowing
the agent’s valuation distribution is the only thing that we need to know to apply the
PIT, from this point onwards we will assume that the valuations declared by the agents
follow the uniform [0,1] distribution. In the work of Santos et al. [16,18], this approach
was used in an analogous way to transform the agent’s cost to the uniform distribution
(see Figure 1. in [18]). Having transformed the agent’s valuation to the uniform [0,1]
distribution, a goodness of fit (GoF) test can define whether an agent’s valuation is
following its true distribution, and act in an analogous manner; this guarantees that
FEDoR is a truthful mechanism (as we prove below).
Non-trivial motivating example We have mentioned before a number of intuitive
examples where FEDoR could apply. What these examples have in common is the
difficulty or inappropriateness of using payments to allocate the resources. This fact, in
combination with the repeated nature of the setting makes FEDoR a perfect candidate
in those scenarios. The good properties of the mechanism though (fairness, social
efficiency and truthfulness) can make it a suitable candidate also to scenarios in which
payments are essential for resource allocation, for example to sponsored search.
As the business model of search engines’ (i.e., Google, Yahoo!, Bing, etc) has
evolved over time their main source of income are the ad links delivered to users each
time they do a search. For each keyword search, there exists a number of available slots
for advertisement in each page of results. Due to the fact that slots are limited while
advertisers are numerous, and in combination with the search engines’ goal for revenue
maximization, auction mechanisms are used for slot allocation.
The setting of sponsored search fits the setting for which FEDoR was designed.
A number of slots (goods in the general version) are allocated over r consecutive in-
stances, having the same advertisers (in a simplified version of the problem) competing
for them. Each slot can be seen as having a relative value. A simple analysis of the
sponsored search auction [5] treats the click-through rate (CTR) of an advertisement as
correlated with the slot positioning and hence this is where the relative value for each
slot emerges.
Two famous auction mechanisms are the Vickrey-Clark-Groves auction (VCG) [4]
and the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP) [5]. VCG is a powerful mechanism
that is strategy proof and efficient (in every instance). In VCG the ith highest bidder
gets the ith best good, but pays the externality that she imposes on the other bidders by
winning that slot. A mechanism like that is difficult to be understood by a normal ad-
vertiser (it is also difficult to determine its valuation), making VCG not such a suitable
candidate for sponsored search. On the other hand there is GSP, were the ith highest
bidder gets the ith best good, but pays to the seller the bid of the (i+1)st highest bidder.
This mechanism is neither strategy proof neither efficient but is easily understandable
by the advertiser. In fact this mechanism was developed by Google and it is also used
by Yahoo!. Adwords [1] of Google uses this mechanism but also takes into account
a “quality score” [2]. Part of that quality score is the click through rate that a specific
advertiser is estimated to obtain if she gets a specific slot. In this case, the allocation
mechanism is basing its result on the product of the estimated CTR multiplied by the
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bid; and the payment of the bidder that wins a slot is obtained by multiplying her bid
by the CTR. As mentioned in the previous paragraph we have modeled the CTR as a
weight of the importance of each slot (like Edelman et al. [5]) and we assume that it is
the same for all bidders .
The key business ingredient of the current sponsored search model is promoting
high quality advertisement (measured through CTR estimation) and in parallel increase
of revenue for the search engine. We argue that in addition to these features, fairness is
a valid business model. Fairness, in the sense that no qualified advertiser would suffer
publicity starvation (obtaining an ad slot few times or never). To this respect, FEDoR
could be used to guarantee fairness. To deal with the payments that the search engine
would require, a flat fee for participating in r rounds could be set.
The mechanism could run centrally on the search engine and advertisers would
communicate their desire to appear to a certain keyword search. For r instances of
this communication with the search engine the advertiser will pay a flat fee. FEDoR
guarantees that in expectation the advertiser will appear the same number of times
in each slot. It also guarantees truthfulness and social efficiency, meaning that if the
advertisers provide their true valuations on the slots they will be receiving a slot when
they most value it.
This business model could also apply to recommendation engines. Consider the ex-
ample of Amazon’s recommendation engine, that after a search for a good recommends
to you several alternative goods. The way in which a decision is taken on which similar
good should be presented to the customer can be based on the FEDoR mechanism, so
that fairness among all similar goods will be guaranteed. A similar example is the one
of showing adds to a newspaper reader related to the content of the news she read.
Comparing FEDoR to the celebrated VCG mechanism, it is clear that VCG has an
advantage since its properties hold deterministically. On the other hand, FEDoR’s prop-
erties hold on expectation. This means that FEDoR can only be applied on a repeated
setting where the agents remain the same. Nevertheless, simulations have shown us
that besides fairness, applying FEDoR to a setting where the need of payments is inher-
ent has another benefit. Due to the necessary flat participation fee scheme, the search
engine (i.e., the seller) can set this fee in such a way to control her utility and the utility
of the advertisers.
Previous and Related Work The concept of mechanisms without money has been
studied before by Schummer and Vohra [20] and Procaccia and Tennenholtz [14]. We
are focusing on mechanisms for resource allocation/distribution. To this respect, a re-
lated work is the one of Guo et al. [7]. They study the problem of allocating a single
item over multiple competing agents in a repeated setting, without the involvement of
money. To do this, they introduce an artificial payment system; they propose a number
of repeated Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms and analyze how competi-
tive they are with mechanisms using money. In their setting they assume, like we do,
that agents learn their private values before each interaction, and also that preferences
are i.i.d according to a distribution that does not change over time. In a later work, Guo
and Conitzer [6] design a strategy proof mechanism for allocating multiple heteroge-
neous goods among two agents, in a single shot, prior-free and payments-free setting.
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FEDoR promotes a truthful declaration of values, since telling the truth increases the
agents benefit (assuming the possibility of the agents being more than two) indepen-
dently of the other agents strategy. Our mechanism considers a setting of multi-round
interactions among the agents, for allocating a set of heterogeneous goods to them. We
assume that all agents distributions can be transformed into a uniform [0,1] distribu-
tion, but besides that we have no information about the distribution of the agents. So,
FEDoR is payment-free mechanism that achieves fairness and efficiency.
The work of Moscibroda and Schmid [12] investigates mechanisms without pay-
ments for throughput maximization and compares their social welfare with payment
mechanisms. In comparison with our work, these mechanisms can be applied in a
non-repeated setting, but it is not guaranteed that a feasible solution in terms of social
welfare can be found. Moscibroda and Schmid shade some light on the degree up to
which payments are inevitable and the potential benefit from the use of mechanism
without payments. In contrast to the kind of mechanisms they consider, in FEDoR
there is no need of a trusted entity. Due to the infeasibility of using money incentives
in many computer science oriented problems, new techniques developed to substitute
monetary incentives, such as the tit-for-tat in BitTorrent [11, 13] and money-burning
mechanisms [8]. Unfortunately, these techniques can not be easily generalized to other
problems. In particular, in [10] interdomain routing is analyzed from a game theo-
retic perspective and incentive-compatible distributed mechanisms without payments
are designed in a repeated setting.
Rahman et al. [15] considers the fairness constraint focusing on P2P systems, and
propose an alternative approach to resource allocation that achieves fairness and effi-
ciency on effort-based incentives, as opposed to contribution or output-based incen-
tives. This work is somehow related to ours by the fact that we also consider that
fairness is not proportional to the valuations of the agents, but in our work no incen-
tives are necessary to achieve efficiency. In addition, we give analytical proofs of the
properties of our mechanism, unlike the work of Rahman et al. [15].
Our work is inspired by the concept of linking mechanisms proposed by Jackson
and Sonnenschein [9]. They show that when a lot of independent copies of the same
decision problem are linked together, then no incentive constrains are needed for agents
to be truthful. The spectrum of players’ responses to a probability distribution is known
by considering a budget restriction. They show that a linking mechanism is valid when
the players’ possible decisions are distributed following discrete probabilities. This
work is a natural extension of the works of Santos et al. [16, 18], were a mechanism
was designed for allocating a single task, that every participating agent desires to have
accomplished, but no agent wants to execute. The designed mechanism is called QPQ
and also uses the concept of linking mechanism. Two fundamental deferences among
FEDoR and QPQ is: (1) they are solving problems with opposite goals, (2) FEDoR
considers multiple good assignment in a single round while QPQ solves the problem
of single task assignments.
Contributions In this paper we propose a mechanism called FEDoR that applies to a
multi-instance setting, for solving the problem of allocating a number of heterogeneous
goods to multiple agents in a round of interaction. The mechanism solves the problem
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without monetary incentives. Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a distributed solution for our mechanism, one in which no central
authority is needed. This does not mean that a centralized solution can not take
place, on the contrary.
• We analytically show that FEDoR guarantees fairness. Meaning that every agent
will receive the ith best good, for every i, the same number of times in expecta-
tion.
• We prove that the mechanism is socially efficient, in the sense that the social
utility (the total valuation of the goods assigned) is maximized, subject to the
fairness property. This means that agents will often receive the ith best good
when they value it the most (over the multiple interactions setting).
• We show that being honest and announcing the real valuation of the goods at
every round maximizes the expected utility (value of goods received) of a player.
This means that the mechanism is truthful.
• We motivate our social mechanism with a number of examples and apply it to a
non-trivial paradigm. Through these examples and a discussion provided at the
end, we motivate the need for the existence of mechanisms without payments.
• Finally, we simulate our mechanism and we are able to compare it in the example
of sponsored search with two classical auction mechanisms. In particular:
– We compare experimentally FEDoR with the established auction mecha-
nisms Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) and (Generalized Second Price) GSP,
in the presence of only honest workers. In contrast to the utilities in VCG
and GSP that are fixed; by appropriately setting a flat participation fee to
the auction, FEDoR can achieve any utility for the seller and the player, in
the sponsored search example. This advantage of our mechanism comes
from the fact that FEDoR is a payments-free mechanism.
– Experimental results go hand by hand with our analytical results asserting
the truthfulness and social efficiency properties. Moreover, experiments
compare the performance in terms of utility between FEDoR, VCG, and
GSP; showing that with FEDoR the utility of the honest players is indepen-
dent of the percentage of cheaters or their cheating behavior, while in VCG
and GSP is dependent.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section Analysis we formally present
our model and notation used throughout the document. In the same section we present
the FEDoR mechanism and an analysis formally proving its properties. In Section Simulation Results,
we presented our simulation results comparing FEDoR with two classical auction mech-
anisms. Finally in Section Discussion we discuss the advantages and limitations of
mechanisms without payments. Also we review briefly the possible limitation of the
mechanism and the future directions we are considering.
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Analysis
Model
Before moving any further, let us define the setting we are considering as well as the
problem we are solving.
Definition 1 (Setting). We consider the presence of n risk-neutral players, N =
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Every one of the n players participates in a (a priori unknown) num-
ber of consecutive instances (each instance is considered a round) of an allocation
game. In each instance of the allocation game:
1. k heterogeneous non-divisible goods are allocated among the n players, where
1 ≤ k < n.
2. For every good i, of the k goods of the round, there exist a relative value depicted
by the weight wi (goods in each round can be different but the relative values
remain the same). We assume that goods are sorted by decreasing weight, i.e.,
w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wk.
3. Players declare how much they value obtaining any of the goods of the set, this
is expressed by a single value.
The outcome set of the game played is the set D of all k-permutations of N (i.e.,
all posible permutations of the subsets of N of size k). Hence, the outcome d =
(d1, d2, . . . , dk) ∈ D is the ordered list of players to whom the slots will be allocated,
so that the player di will receive the ith slot (whose weight is wi).
Each player privately observes her preferences over the alternatives in D before
the collective choice in the game is made. This is modeled by assuming that player i
privately observes a parameter θi, which determines her preferences over obtaining a
good from the set. We say that θi is the player type, for every player i. The set of all
possible types of player i is Θi. We denote by θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) the vector of player
types. The set of all possible vectors is Θ = Θ1 ×Θ2 × . . .Θn. We denote by θ−i the
vector obtained by removing θi from θ.
Thus, we denote by Π = ∆(Θ) (in general, we denote by ∆(S) the set of all
probability distributions over some set S). the set of all probability distributions over
Θ. It is assumed that there is a common prior distribution pi ∈ Π that is shared by
all the players. We denote by pii ∈ ∆(Θi) the marginal probability of θi. We define
pii(θi|θ−i) as the conditional probability distribution of θi given θ−i.
In this work we assume that the player types are normalized, in the sense that
Θi = [0, 1], for every player i. Moreover, for every player i the marginal probability
pii of θi is also normalized as the uniform continuous distribution in the interval [0, 1].
This are not simple assumptions as in the work of Santos et al. [16, 18], applying the
Probability Integral Transformation (PIT) we can transform any probability distribution
to the uniform [0,1] Finally, we assume that all distributions pii are independent, i.e.,
pi(·|θ−i) = pii(·). For this reasons we have made the simplification of having our
notations free from the concept of the round.
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Players’ preferences over outcomes are represented by a utility function ui(d, θi) ∈
R defined over all d ∈ D and θi ∈ Θi. In this paper the utility function is defined as
ui(d, θi) = θi
∑k
j=1 wjδidj , ∀i ∈ N, ∀d ∈ D, where δab is the Kronecker delta.
We assume that the set of outcomes D, the set of players N , the type sets in Θ, the
common prior distribution pi ∈ Π, and the utility functions ui are common knowledge
for all the players. Similarly, the game rules defined by the mechanism used are also
common knowledge. However, the specific type θi observed by player i belongs to her
private information.
A strategy for the player i is a map σi : Θi → ∆(Θi), where σi(θˆi|θi) is the
conditional probability that the player reports θˆi when her true type is θi. A strategy σi
is truthful (and we say that the player is honest) if, for every pair (θˆi, θi), σi(θˆi|θi) = 1
if θˆi = θi and 0 otherwise. As usually done, we will use θˆi to denote the reported type,
and θi the actual type.
In the paper we assume the availability of a goodness of fit (GoF) test, that can test
whether a value (a reported type in our case) is a sample from a uniform distribution in
[0, 1]. Hence, GoF Test(θˆi) is true if and only if θˆi is a uniform random sample. By
this definition we assume that the GoF test is perfect, but this is a theoretical artifice.
In Section Simulation Results, through simulations we find a good approximation to a
perfect GoF test.
In this paper, we search for a mechanism 〈Θ, g〉, where g : Θˆ → ∆(D) is the
decision function. With this function, g(d|θˆ) is the conditional probability that the
mechanism decides d ∈ D when the players report θˆ. The mechanism must be without
utility transfers (payments) and satisfy the following properties.
• Fairness. Every player i (honest or not) gets the jth slot, the same proportion of
times in expectation, for every j. I.e.,
E
θ,θˆ∈Θ

 ∑
d∈D:dj=i
g(d|θˆ)

 = E
θ,θˆ∈Θ

 ∑
d∈D:dj=i′
g(d|θˆ)

 , ∀i, i′ ∈ N, ∀j ∈ [1, k], ∀σ.
(1)
• Truthfulness. The strategy that maximizes the utility of a player i is to be honest.
I.e.,
E
θ,θˆ∈Θ
[∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g(d|θi, θˆ−i)
]
≥ E
θ,θˆ∈Θ
[∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g(d|θˆ)
]
, ∀i ∈ N, ∀σ.
(2)
• Social Efficiency. If all players are honest, the expected social utility with de-
cision function g is maximized with respect to any other decision function g′.
I.e.,
Eθ∈Θ
[∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g(d|θ)
]
≥ Eθ∈Θ
[∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g
′(d|θ)
]
. (3)
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The FEDoR Mechanism
FEDoR solves the problem of allocating multiple resources in a multi-instance setting,
with a decision function that is such that the properties of fairness, truthfulness and
social efficiency are satisfied without utility transfers. Algorithm 1 describes the steps
that a generic player i executes and the actions taken by the mechanism. This algorithm
represents how the mechanism can be applied in a distributed setting, in the absence of
a central authority that takes the allocation decision.
In every instance of the allocation game (defined as a new announcement of k
goods to be allocated) a player i observes its type θi. Then, applying its strategy σi,
the player chooses a type θˆi that will be reported as the player’s bid. These bids are
gossiped among all players, so that all of them end with the same vector of reported
types θˆ. We are assuming that communication among players is perfect (reliable and
synchronous). Once a player has received all the reported types from the rest of the
players, the algorithm moves on, applying the mechanism.
Each player applies the mechanism to obtain the allocation decision. The deci-
sion function gf : Θ → D of FEDoR is one where gf (θˆ) = (i1, i2, . . . ik) such that
(i1, i2, . . . ik) : vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ . . . vik and vik ≥ vi∀i ∈ N \ {i1, ..ik} where
vi =
{
θˆi GoFtest(θˆi)
pseudorandom(θˆ−i) otherwise
In other words the decision function of FEDoR is one that given the vector of declared
types θˆi provides the vector of players (i1, i2, . . . ik) receiving the k goods, by ij we
declare the player receiving the jth good. The decision of the mechanism is based
on a cheaters (following a strategy besides declaring their true type) detection scheme.
Recall that, as we explained in Subsection each player has a uniform continuous dis-
tribution in the interval [0,1] over all instances. This is a common information that all
players share and allows them to verify announced types of the rest of the players. If
the player i declared type θˆi passes the goodness of fit (GoF) test then the declared
value is accepted. Otherwise the declared value is replaced, by each player, by a pseu-
dorandom value uniform in [0, 1] derived from the rest of reported types θˆ−i. Since all
players apply the same perfect goodness-of-fit test to the same value θˆi, and the same
pseudorandom function to the same vector θˆ−i, they all assign the same value to vi.
As a result, the same vector v is obtained by each player, which contains the values
of the players that passed the test and the generated values for those that did not. The
mechanism allocates the k goods in order to the k players with the highest value in the
vector v.
It is important to notice that the algorithm is the same for all players and that it is
based on information known by all of them. Therefore, no central entity is required
to apply the FEDoR mechanism. Of course, if the environment is such that a central
authority is available, the algorithm can trivially be transformed to accommodate a
centralized solution using FEDoR.
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Formal Analysis
In this section we analyze the FEDoR mechanism and we show that the three desired
properties described in Subsection Model, namely fairness, truthfulness, and social
efficiency are satisfied. We start by proving the latter.
We show that FEDoR is socially efficient if all players are honest. To prove this,
first we prove that there is no mechanism that has a decision function that gives a higher
utility to a player, independently of the declared types Θ.
Lemma 1. There is no mechanism 〈Θ, g〉 such that
E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g(d|θ)] > E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)gf (d|θ)].
Proof. Assume the claim is not true. Then, there is a mechanism 〈Θ, g〉 such that
E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g(d|θ)] > E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)gf (d|θ)]. (4)
This means that there is at least one θ such that∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g(d|θ) >
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)gf (d|θ). (5)
Let dx = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) be an outcome that maximizes
∑
i∈N ui(dx, θi).
Then,
∑
i∈N ui(dx, θi) ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D ui(d, θi)g(d|θ). On the other hand, let gf(df |θ) =
1 for df = (i1, i2, . . . , ik). By the definition of ui, this means that
∑k
j=1 θxjwj >∑k
j=1 θijwj . However, this is not possible, since w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wk, and the values
θij are the largest values in θ in decreasing order, i.e., θi1 ≥ θi2 ≥ · · · ≥ θik . Hence,
the mechanism 〈Θ, g〉 does not exist.
Since there is no mechanism that has a decision function that is better than the
one of FEDoR mechanism, then we can also proof that when all players are honest
(a.k.a declaring their true type) the social utility (i.e. the total utility of all players) is
maximized.
Theorem 1 (Social efficiency). For any mechanism 〈Θ, g〉 and strategies σi, ∀i ∈ N ,
it holds that
E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)gf (d|θ)] ≥ E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g(d|θˆ)|σ1, . . . , σn].
Proof. Assume the claim is not true, and hence there is a mechanism 〈Θ, g〉 and strate-
gies σi, ∀i ∈ N , such that
E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)gf (d|θ)] < E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g(d|θˆ)|σ1, . . . , σn]. (6)
Then, let us define a new mechanism 〈Θ, g′〉 as follows. g′(d|θ) =
∫
1
0
∫
1
0
. . .
∫
1
0
g(d|θˆ) ·
σ1(θˆ1|θ1) · . . . · σn(θˆn|θn)dθˆndθˆn−1 . . . dθˆ1. The decision function g′(·) assigns the same
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probability to each possible outcome d as the combination of the strategies σi(·) and
the decision function g(·). Thus,
E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)gf (d|θ)] < E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g(d|θˆ)|σ1, . . . , σn] (7)
= E[
∑
i∈N
∑
d∈D
ui(d, θi)g
′(d|θ)], (8)
contradicting Lemma 1.
We will now start proving the truthfulness property of the FEDoR mechanism. Let
us denote by E[Uˆi|σ1, . . . , σn] the expected utility of player i under the FEDoR mech-
anism when players follow strategy σi, ∀i ∈ N .
Lemma 2. For any non empty set of players S ⊂ N , the total expected utility of the
players in S does not depend on the strategies of the rest of players.
Proof. We start by proving that the expected utility of a player i does not depend on
the strategy of another player h 6= i. In particular, we will show that E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x ∈
N ] = E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x 6= h;h honest], i.e., that the utility of i does not depend on whether
h is honest or not, which implies the former statement.
For every player x ∈ N , let fx(vx, θx) be the density function of the pairs of values
(vx, θx), where θx is the type observed by player x and vx is the entry corresponding
to x in the vector v used to decide in FEDoR (see Algorithm 1). If the strategy σx(·)
induces a uniform distribution on the reported types θˆx (recall that θx does follow a
uniform distribution), then the values vx will always be the declared types (bid) θˆx.
Otherwise, the GoF test will always fail and vx will be pseudorandom values generated
from the rest of declared values. In any case, the values vx are uniformly distributed,
and the function fx is independent from the rest of functions fi, ∀i 6= x. Moreover, the
marginal distributions of fx(vx, θx) must also be uniform.
Let us consider any player i ∈ S. The expected utility E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x ∈ N ] of the
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player can then be computed as
∑
d∈D
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n
ui(d|θi)gf (d|v)f1(v1, θ1) · · · fn(vn, θn) (9)
dv1 · · · dvndθ1 · · · dθn (10)
=
∑
d∈D
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n−1
ui(d|θi)gf (d|v)f1(v1, θ1) · · · (11)
fh−1(vh−1, θh−1)fh+1(vh+1, θh+1) · · · fn(vn, θn) (12)∫ 1
0
fh(vh, θh)dθhdv1 · · · dvndθ1 · · · dθh−1dθh+1 · · · dθn (13)
=
∑
d∈D
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n−1
ui(d|θi)gf (d|v)f1(v1, θ1) · · · (14)
fh−1(vh−1, θh−1)fh+1(vh+1, θh+1) · · · fn(vn, θn) (15)
dv1 · · · dvndθ1 · · · dθh−1dθh+1 · · · dθn. (16)
The first equality follows from the independence of fh from the other fj . The last
equality follows from the fact that
∫ 1
0 fh(vh, θh)dθh = 1, from the uniform marginal
distribution of fh with respect to θh. Now, applying a change of variable, we can
replace in the above expression vh by θh, resulting after reordering in
E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x ∈ N ] =
∑
d∈D
∫
1
0
· · ·
∫
1
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n−1
ui(d|θi)gf (d|v−h, θh) (17)
f1(v1, θ1) · · · fh−1(vh−1, θh−1)fh+1(vh+1, θh+1) · · · (18)
fn(vn, θn)dv1 · · · dvh−1dθhdvh+1 · · · dvndθ1 · · · dθn (19)
= E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x 6= h;h honest]. (20)
This property can now be applied iteratively for every player h /∈ S, showing that
the expected utility of i ∈ S is independent of the strategy of the players in S. Summing
over all the players in S the claim of the lemma is proved.
Using Lemma 2 we can proof the truthfulness property.
Theorem 2 (Truthfulness). The strategy that maximizes the utility of a player i is to be
honest. I.e., E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x ∈ N ] ≤ E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x 6= i; i honest].
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the claim is not true. Then, there are strategies
σx, ∀x ∈ N such that
E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x ∈ N ] > E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x 6= i; i honest]. (21)
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From Lemma 2 we have the following identities (the third one uses linearity of expec-
tations).
E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x ∈ N ] = E[Uˆi|σi;x is honest, ∀x 6= i] (22)
E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x 6= i; i honest] = E[Uˆi|all players are honest] (23)
E[
∑
h 6=i
Uˆh|σi;x is honest, ∀x 6= i] = E[
∑
h 6=i
Uˆh|all players are honest] (24)
Replacing equations 22 and 23 in 21, we obtain
E[Uˆi|σi;x is honest, ∀x 6= i] > E[Uˆi|all players are honest]. (25)
Which added to 24 yields
E[
∑
h∈N
Uˆh|σi;x is honest, ∀x 6= i] > E[
∑
h∈N
Uˆh|all players are honest]. (26)
However, this contradicts Theorem 1.
We concentrate now in the fairness property. Recall the FEDoR mechanism as
it was described in the previous subsection. Either because the player reports types
that are uniformly distributed, or because they are replaced by FEDoR with uniform
pseudorandom values. The values vi of the vector v used to distribute the goods are
independent random samples form a uniform distribution [0, 1]. Hence the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 (Fairness). Every player i (honest or not) has the same probability 1/n of
getting the jth slot, for every j.
Proof. Since the elements of the vector v are independent uniform samples as men-
tioned, the probability that the value vi is the jth largest in v is
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
(1 −
vi)
j−1vn−ji . Then the probability that a player i has the jth largest value in v, given
that vi takes values uniformly between 0 and 1 is∫ 1
0
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
(1− vi)
j−1vn−ji dvi =
1
n
(27)
Finally, we will analyze the expected utility of the players depending on their strat-
egy. We start by presenting the expect utility of an honest player. Observe that the
utility obtained is independent from the strategies of the rest of players, as proven in
Lemma 2.
Theorem 4. The expected utility of an honest player i is
E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x 6= i; i honest] =
∑k
j=1
wj(n−j+1)
n(n+1) . This value is independent from the
strategies σx, ∀x 6= i.
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Proof. Since i is honest, she reports her true type θi, which follows a uniform distribu-
tion. Hence, it holds that vi = θi. As in the proof of Theorem 3, the probability that
the type θi is the jth largest value is
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
(1− θi)
j−1θn−ji . Then, the expected
utility can be computed as
E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x 6= i; i honest]
=
k∑
j=1
wj
∫ 1
0
θi
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
(1− θi)
j−1θn−ji dθi
=
∑j
i=1 wj(n− j + 1)
n(n+ 1)
(28)
We now find the utility of a player i that is not honest (a.k.a cheater), but she
reports values that are not uniform (and hence the goodness-of-fit test always fails) or
she reports types θˆi that are uniform but independent of her true types θi. Observe
that this theorem does not consider the case when the types reported are uniform and
somehow correlated with the real types (this is left to be shown experimentally).
Theorem 5. The expected utility of a dishonest player i that reports non uniform types
or types independent of her true normalized uniform distribution is E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x ∈
N ] = 12n
∑k
j=1 wj .
Proof. In this case, the value vi used to distribute the slots follow a uniform distribution
that is independent of the actual type θi of player i. Hence,
E[Uˆi|σx, ∀x ∈ N ]
=
k∑
j=1
wj
∫ 1
0
θi
∫ 1
0
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
(1− vi)
j−1vn−ji dvidθi
=
1
2n
k∑
j=1
wj .
(29)
Simulation Results
FEDoR is a mechanism for distributing/allocating goods, without monetary incentives,
in the presence of strategic agents. It guarantees an allocation of the goods that will be
fair and socially efficient, given that the mechanism is truthful (strategy-proof). The
good properties of the mechanism are feasible under a specific setting, discussed in
Subsection Model. Under that setting, we simulate FEDoR in the scenario of spon-
sored search (presented in the Introduction section). Simulations compare FEDoR with
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the VCG and GSP mechanisms in two cases: (1) only honest players are present, (2)
dishonest players are present. Additionally, simulations examine the cost of not having
a perfect GoF test and the length of the historical test that would yield an almost perfect
GoF test.
Presence of only honest players: In this scenario we look at an instance where the
players are following an honest strategy. This could happen either because the mech-
anism is strategy proof, which is the case of VCG and FEDoR or because they just
choose to follow an honest strategy. We consider the scenario of sponsored search and
we compute the utilities of the seller and and the players in all three mechanisms. The
utilities are computed in two distinct scenarios: (a) the presence of 9 players is assumed
and the number of the available ad slots k varies from 1 to 8; the weight for each slot
values in decreasing order from k to 1. (b) the number of ad slots is fixed to k = 3 and
the number of players varies from 4 to 9. Additionally we assume that, for the purpose
of experimentation, the GoF test used is perfect. The results obtained are presented in
Fig 1, where we plot the utility achieved by one of the players (all players are honest
and follow a uniform distribution) against the utility of the seller. In the case of FEDoR,
we plot the utility values assuming that the same flat fee is paid by every player, so that
the utility of the seller is simply this flat fee multiplied by the number of players. The
utility of a player, on the other hand, is the value she assigns to the slots she gets (which
is essentially the value given in Theorem 4) minus the flat fee.
In Fig 1(a) it can be observed that the utilities are the same for VCG (with external-
ity) and GSP in the case of auctioning one slot. When the number of slots increases,
the utility of the seller is greater with GSP than with VCG, while on the other hand the
utility of the player is greater with VCG than with GSP. This behavior was expected
since GSP is a mechanism that favours the seller. Moreover, it is not strategy proof,
something that would not put the player in an advantageous position if she is honest
compared to VCG. The utilities with the FEDoR mechanism, on its hand, form a line
that is a function of the flat fee players pay. It is worth to observe that all the points that
correspond to GSP and VCG utilities are on the FEDoR line, which means that with the
appropriate value of the flat fee, FEDoR can achieve the same seller and player utililites
as GSP and VCG. Moreover, the advantage of FEDoR, as it is shown in Fig 1(a), is
that the flat fee provides a tradeoff between seller and player utilities, and allows to
chose any point in the lines shown in the figure. Hence, FEDoR has an adjustable
performance that can be changed depending on the needs of the seller. In Fig 1(b) we
make similar observations and derive the same conclusions. Again the utilities of GSP
and VCG lie on the FEDoR line, and the utilities with FEDoR can be tuned with the
flat fee. In addition, we notice that when the number of players increases, their utility
decreases in all three mechanisms. On the contrary, the utility of the seller increases in
all three mechanisms when the number of player increases.
Presence of dishonest players: In this section we assume that the players are dis-
honest set as our GoF test the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test and we evaluate its
performance. Through simulations we examine the conditions under which the KS test
performs optimally and we evaluate the impact of this optimality to our mechanism.
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Simulations show that FEDoR is a truthful mechanism. We compare the utility of FE-
DoR with VCG and GSP in a number of scenarios where the cheating behavior of the
players varies. Having as a base case the scenario where all players are honest, we
compare the way in which the honest and dishonest players’ utility is affected. Finally,
we show how the social utility is affected by the presence of dishonest players in all
three mechanisms considered.
Unless otherwise stated, our results have been obtained by running 100 experiments
of 10000 rounds (auctions) each. The number of participating players is 9 and the
number of slots is k = 3. The weights assigned to the slots are w1 = 3, w2 = 2, w3 =
1. Recall that honest players are considered the ones that reveal their true valuation for
the set of goods. Cheater players are the ones declaring a different valuation from their
actual valuation on the set of goods. All players’ private valuations follow independent
uniform distributions in the interval [0, 1].
To evaluate the impact of the presence of dishonest players in their utility, the util-
ity of the honest players, and also in the social utility, we have simulated 10 distinct
scenarios. The scenarios we consider are as follows. Scenario A: 9 honest players
following the uniform distribution, B: 8 honest players and one cheater with normal
distribution (µ = 0.5, σ = 0.15), C: 8 honest players and one cheater with beta dis-
tribution with β = 0.9, D: 8 honest players and one cheater with beta distribution
with β = 0.7, E: 8 honest players and one cheater with a random uniform distribution
(different from its own distribution of values), F : 6 honest players and 3 cheaters with
random uniform distributions, G: 6 honest players and 3 cheaters with beta distribu-
tions (β = 0.9), H : 6 honest players and 3 cheaters with beta distributions (β = 0.7),
I: 6 honest players and 3 cheaters with normal distributions (µ = 0.5, σ = 0.15), J : 5
honest players, 1 cheater with random uniform distribution, 1 cheater with beta distri-
bution (β = 0.9), 1 cheater with beta distribution (β = 0.7), and 1 cheater with normal
distribution (µ = 0.5, σ = 0.15).
First we examine the performance of the KS test when it is used as the GoF test
in FEDoR. Fig 2 evaluates the impact of the history length in the accuracy of the test.
As it can be seen the KS test is a good fit for our mechanism. The history length
refers to the number of values the test keeps as a reference to decide whether the new
value reported by the player follows the uniform distribution. Notice that, in all three
graphs of Fig 2, in the case where the player has a uniform distribution, as the history
length gets smaller, the number of false positives increases. In addition to that, we
have checked what happens in the case when the player cheats with a distribution that
may resemble (or not) the uniform distribution. We have chosen the beta distributions
with different parameter and a normal distribution. As you can see from the plots
in Fig 5 and Fig 6, with a beta distribution and a large β parameter, the player can
approximate the uniform behavior, and thus it is difficult for the KS test to identify
a cheater. Notice that in all three graphs of Fig 2, as the length of the history test
decreases, the percentage of true positives decreases. For different values on the upper
bound threshold of the p.value (which decides the acceptance of a value based on the
history), we have noticed that using a p.value < 0.1 is a good balance between having
large percentage of true positives and not having too many false positives. For example,
for a history length of 1000 rounds (which is a value that does not give a great overhead
to the mechanism), in Fig 2(a), where p.value < 0.05, the true positives are close to
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75%; in Fig 2(b), where p.value < 0.1, the true positives are close to 82%; while in
Fig 2(c), where the p.value < 0.2, the true positives are close to 95% while the false
positive are much higher than in the other scenarios (close to 20%). Hence, selecting
1000 rounds as the history of the mechanism, provides a good performance and is large
enough if we compare it with the 10000 rounds that our scenarios execute as part of
the online auction process. In the rest of the section we will run experiments with a
history length of 1000 and KS test with p.value < 0.1. Before actual auctions are run,
the history buffer is filled with 1000 values, so the results are not affected by history’s
transient states.
We investigate now the utility of the honest players and cheaters in a variety of
different scenarios, while having the KS test as our GoF test. In this study we assume
that the players pay no flat fee. We have shown analytically (assuming a perfect GoF
test) that the best strategy for each player is to be honest. Our experimental results come
to assert this even in the case where the GoF is not perfect. From Fig 3(a), the utility of
the honest player is greater than the cheater in all scenarios considered. Independently
of the behavior of the rest of the players, the mean utility of the honest player is around
the same value of 5400. There is no cheating strategy that will give a higher utility.
Especially in scenarios C and G where the player cheats with a beta (where parameter
is β = 0.9) indeed the cheaters increase their mean utility by roughly around 500 units
but still the mean utility of the honest player is around 1500 units higher. This also
proves the efficiency of the KS test for p.value < 0.1 and history length 1000. The
horizontal (blue) line in Fig 3(a) represents the value of utility as it is calculated from
the analytical part. Notice that the analytical value is quite close to the experimental
with the single exception of the player cheating with beta, where β = 0.9.
Going one step further now we compare the utility of players when FEDoR is used
with the cases where VCG and GSP are used. As Fig 3 shows, the honest player has
always a larger utility compared with the utility of the cheating player in all scenarios
considered, and in all mechanisms. However, in some scenarios the distance between
the utility of a cheater and an honest player is very small (see, e.g., scenario H in
Fig 3(b)). It is also interesting to notice that in FEDoR in scenario A, where all players
are honest, the utility of the player is maximized compared to the honest players in the
rest of the scenarios. This is not the case for the other two mechanisms (see scenario I
for both VCG and GSP).
The utility of an honest player with VCG and GSP can vary significantly depending
on the scenario. In any case, it is always around 1100 for VCG and 700 for GSP.
Comparing with FEDoR, the utility of an honest player with the latter is up to four times
larger than those with VCG and GSP. This is due to the fact that in our experiments we
assumed that the flat fee of the player is zero. As we showed though in Fig 1, the flat
fee is something that can be adjusted to match the desired utility of the player (or the
seller).
Finally, from Fig 4 (a) we see that the social utility is maximized in FEDoR when
all players are truthful (scenario A compared with the rest of scenarios). This does not
hold for the other two mechanisms. As you can see from Fig 4 (b) and (c) scenarios B
and I (where dishonest players cheat with normal distribution µ = 0.5, σ = 0.15) have
greater social utility than scenario A where they are all honest. We can also notice that
the social utility in FEDoR is up to four times larger than those of GSP and VCG (but,
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of course, we are assuming no flat fee).
Discussion
Although powerful mechanisms (such as VCG) exist that, under monetary incentives,
achieve the designed goals, cashing out payments is not always feasible. Maybe the
system is distributed and no central authority exists that can guarantee the payments,
or payments are too impractical. Another possibility is that the nature of the setting is
such that payments are not allowed (i.e., a public common good). According to [3, 19]
mechanisms without monetary incentives have limited capabilities. A case by case
study is the only hope for finding mechanisms with good properties and without pay-
ments, like in [10,12]. FEDoR is a general mechanism that is truthful, fair and socially
efficient, and without using monetary incentives. The inherent repeated nature of FE-
DoR, though, makes it applicable only to settings with infinite or unknown number of
repetitions. If the number of repetitions is known to the agents, then they can devise a
strategy that would maximize their utility and potentially lead to a non-truthful mech-
anism. Our intuition is that, if the nature of the problem allows it, mechanisms like
FEDoR can be devised for other problems as well. Taking advantage of the repeated in-
teraction between the agents, and applying the concept of linking mechanisms, should
allow to derive other mechanisms without payments for multiple combinations of desir-
able properties (i.e., different fairness criteria, strategy proofness, social efficiency, etc).
An additional advantage, as we have seen experimentally, is that a mechanism without
payments like FEDoR was able, without incentivizing the workers through payments,
to provide a way for the mechanism designer to select its utility and the utility of the
participating players.
While FEDoR is a mechanism with several interesting features, there are some is-
sues that are worth discussing. FEDoR assumes that the valuations of the players follow
a uniform distribution. Although this might seem as a constraint, if the real bids do not
follow such a distribution, they can be transformed by using the PIT transformation, as
proposed by Santos et al. [18]. Moreover we make the assumption that all players have
i.i.d. valuations. As this is a first approach towards this line of mechanisms without
monetary incentives we wanted to keep our model simple. In an extension of the mech-
anism, we plan to explore the correlated case where players distributions are correlated
with those of other players [17].
An additional extension to the mechanism would be to allow players to provide their
valuation for a particular good of the set and not for the whole set, as it is implemented
now. This is yet another challenge, since players might have correlated preferences
between certain goods in the same or different round.
For the sponsored search scenario we have considered that all players pay the same
flat fee. There could be the case that players with a higher budget would like to claim
a larger number of slot over the consecutive rounds, something that FEDoR does not
allow to happen due to the fairness property. An approach to solve this constrain of
FEDoR would be to allow a player with a higher budget to participate with more than
one identity. As a consequence, she will be increasing the amount of goods that she
will receive, proportionally to the number of identities. Again though, allowing players
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to have multiple identities one must assume that that players might have correlated
preferences.
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Figures
Figure 1. Comparing FEDoR with VCG and GSP in the mean utility of seller
and player per auction. The values for FEDoR form a line in each experiment, since
the utilities of seller and players can be tuned with the flat fee. The values for VCG
and GSP always lie on the corresponding FEDoR line. Plots represent the mean utility
per auction of the seller and one player over 10000 rounds of execution and 100
experiments. (a) Scenarios with 9 player and the number of slots increasing from 1
(leftmost line) to 8 (rightmost line). (b) Scenarios with 3 slots and the players
decreasing from 9 (line with largest slope) to 4 (line with smallest slope).
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Figure 2. The percentage of positives with the KS test as a function of the history
length of the KS test. (a) The upper bound threshold of the p.value of the KS test is
0.05, (b) the upper bound threshold of the p.value of the KS test is 0.1, (c) the upper
bound threshold of the p.value of the KS test is 0.2. From bottom to top the lines
represent the behavior in a scenario with no cheaters, cheaters bidding values with a
beta distribution where β = 0.9, cheaters bidding values with a beta distribution where
β = 0.7, and cheaters bidding values with a normal distribution (µ = 0.5, σ = 0.15).
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Figure 3. The utility of an honest player compared to a cheating player in
different scenarios. (a) Using the FEDoR mechanism, for p.value< 0.1 and history
length 1000 (the blue line represents the analytical utility values). (b) Using the VCG
mechanism. (c) Using the GSP mechanism. The left box for each mechanism (marked
A) represents the distribution of the utility of an honest player in a scenario where all
9 players are honest following a uniform. Right top box represents the utility of
honest players that follow a uniform distribution in scenarios B − J . Left bottom box
represents the utilities of cheating players with the distributions defined in scenarios
B − J . Scenarios are as follows, B: 8 honest players and one cheater with normal
distribution (µ = 0.5, σ = 0.15), C: 8 honest players and one cheater with beta
distribution with β = 0.9, D: 8 honest players and one cheater with beta distribution
with β = 0.7, E: 8 honest players and one cheater with a random uniform distribution
(different from its own distribution of values), F : 6 honest players and 3 cheaters with
random uniform distributions, G: 6 honest players and 3 cheaters with beta
distributions (β = 0.9), H : 6 honest players and 3 cheaters with beta distributions
(β = 0.7), I: 6 honest players and 3 cheaters with normal distributions
(µ = 0.5, σ = 0.15), J : 5 honest players, 1 cheater with random uniform distribution,
1 cheater with beta distribution (β = 0.9), 1 cheater with beta distribution (β = 0.7),
and 1 cheater with normal distribution (µ = 0.5, σ = 0.15), which is the one
represented in the plot.
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Figure 4. The social utility in different scenarios. (a) Using the FEDoR mechanism,
for p.value¡0.1 and history lenght 1000 (b) Using the VCG mechanism. (c) Using the
GSP mechanism. The scenarios A to J are the same as in Fig 3.
Figure 5. Different strategies, modelled as a β = 0.7 probability distribution.(a)
The declared values are not correlated with the true values (following a uniform
distribution). (b) The declared values are correlated with the true values (following a
uniform distribution). Note that the marginal distribution represented in the x-axis
corresponds to the declared values of the agent, while the y-axis represents the true
values of the agent.
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Figure 6. Different strategies, modelled as a β = 0.9 probability distribution.(a)
The declared values are not correlated with the true values (following a uniform
distribution). (b) The declared values are correlated with the true values (following a
uniform distribution). Note that the marginal distribution represented in the x-axis
corresponds to the declared values of the agent, while the y-axis represents the true
values of the agent.
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Algorithms
Algorithm 1 FEDoR Algorithm (code for player i)
foreach k set of goods do
Observe type θi
Choose type θˆi using probability distribution σi(·|θi) (player i’s strategy)
Broadcast the type θˆi (this is the bid of player i)
Wait to receive the reported types θˆ from all the players in N
d← gf (θˆ) \\ applying the FEDoR mechanism
if (i = dj) then player i receives the jth slot
26
